Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Knowledge Puzzles
نویسندگان
چکیده
We briefly give an overview of Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), mainly in semantic terms. We focus on the simplest of epistemic actions in DEL, called public announcements. We also sketch the effect of more complex epistemic actions, and briefly show how als factual change can be modelled in the same framework. We then apply the logic of public announcements in DEL to the analysis of a knowledge puzzle, called ‘What Sum’.
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