Median Stable Matching for College Admissions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings. JEL classification: C78, D63.
منابع مشابه
Mechanisms : Student - optimality vs
1. Abstract The college admissions problem is an example of a two-sided matching market. Even though it is closely-related to the stable marriage problem, it is in fact not equivalent. However, the problems are similar enough that the mechanisms used to solve them share some properties—the mechanisms are only guaranteed to produce an optimal stable outcome for one of the parties, but not both. ...
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 34 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006