(In)Efficiency in Intrahousehold Allocations *
نویسندگان
چکیده
Previous research using plot-level agricultural data from Burkina Faso found that the allocation of resources within African households was Pareto inefficient, contradicting most collective models of intrahousehold bargaining. I provide an explanation for these households' Pareto inefficient behavior and I test its robustness using an alternative dataset also collected in Burkina Faso. Households experiencing exogenous negative rainfall shocks are less likely in that year to exhibit Pareto inefficient intrahousehold allocations. These negative rainfall shocks are correlated with increases in labor resources allocated to the wife's plots, further confirming that in bad years, households try to avoid losses from Pareto inefficiency.
منابع مشابه
Understanding Pareto Inefficient Intrahousehold Allocations
Understanding Pareto Inefficient Intrahousehold Allocations Udry (1996) uses household survey data and finds that the allocation of resources within households is Pareto inefficient, contradicting the main assumption of most collective models of intrahousehold bargaining. He finds that among plots planted with the same crop in the same year, within a given household, those controlled by women p...
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