CARESS Working Paper #95-08 Necessary and Su±cient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis
نویسنده
چکیده
Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) have shown that if players' beliefs about the future evolution of play is absolutely continuous with respect to play induced by optimal strategies then Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we present the ̄rst set of necessary and su±cient conditions that ensure that Bayesian updating eventually leads to Nash equilibrium. More important, we show that absolute continuity does not rule out any observable behavior that is asymptotically consistent with Nash equilibrium.
منابع مشابه
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If players cannot perfectly synchronize their actions in co-ordination games, the e±cient equilibrium is never achieved.
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