Measurements of Radiation from a Soviet Warhead

Downsizing Russia ’ s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure Report

Over a period of 50 years, the Soviet Union built a giant infrastructure dedicated to designing, manufacturing, and maintaining nuclear bombs and warheads for a wide variety of strategic and tactical weapons systems (see Table 1). Under the conditions of the Soviet economic and political system, this nuclear weapons production complex developed into a self-sufficient, vastly redundant, and high...

Central Intelugence Agency

2. Unlike the US, the USSR appears to favor intercept of IBMs and ICBM6at altitudes above ' 130,000 feet, possibly for protection of the ground area against full scale detonation of the target warhead. I At least one popular Soviet book has also indicated such an intercept altitude. This concept ignores the advantages of "atmospheric sorting" as an aid to deccy discrimination; there Is no.indic...

Official Use Only Interim Technical Report on Radiation Signatures for Monitoring Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement

A New Approach to Nuclear Warhead Verification Using a Zero-Knowledge Protocol

Warhead verification systems proposed to date fundamentally rely on the use of information barriers to prevent the release of sensitive information. Measurements with information barriers significantly increase the complexity of inspection systems, make their certification and authentication difficult, and may reduce the overall confidence in the verifiability of future arms-control agreements....

Authenticating Nuclear Warheads With High Confidence

Negotiated deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenals may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in states’ stockpiles, which could require inspections on hundreds or thousands of warheads or warhead components currently in storage or in dismantlement queues. The process of authenticating treaty limited items, e.g. with passive or active radiation measurements, is likely to be a critical ...