Multiproduct Cournot Oligopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present a general model of oligopolistic quantity competition in which each firm is able to produce multiple quality-differentiated products. We identify a tight relationship between asymmetries in the technological capabilities of firms and the equilibrium structure of product lines. The qualities offered by a firm group naturally into brands, and the positions of such brands are determined in a precise way by the technological limitations of less capable firms.
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