All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus
نویسنده
چکیده
There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer–seller exact representative.
منابع مشابه
On the nucleolus of neighbor games
Assignment problems are well-known problems in practice. We mention house markets, job markets, and production planning. The games of interest in this paper, the neighbor games, arise from a special class of assignment problems. We focus on the nucleolus [D. Schmeidler, SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17 (1969) 1163–1170], one of the most prominent core solutions. A core solution is interesting with respec...
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