Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?

Most of us take it for granted that we ought to be rational—to have the bundle of dispositions and abilities that constitute the faculty of rationality. Most of us also take it for granted that we ought to satisfy various individual requirements of rationality: we ought not to believe it is Monday and also believe it is not Monday; we ought to intend to catch the 12.50, if we intend to get to a meeting and believe catching the 12.50 is the only way to get there; and so on. There is a genuine question whether these things are so: ought we to be rational, and ought we to satisfy the individual requirements of rationality? In this paper, I shall suggest that the answer to the first question is plausibly ‘‘Yes’’, but I shall concentrate particularly on the second question. I shall explain that I have found no satisfactory grounds for answering ‘‘Yes’’ to it. For the moment, I doubt that, necessarily, we ought to satisfy each of the individual requirements of rationality. Indeed, I doubt that, necessarily, we have any reason to satisfy each of these requirements.