Does opportunism pay off?

نویسندگان

  • Linda G. Veiga
  • Francisco José Veiga
چکیده

In Portugal, increases in investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking re-election. The political payoff to opportunistic spending increased after democracy became well-established in the country. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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تاریخ انتشار 2007