Umbrella branding with imperfect observability and moral hazard

نویسنده

  • Luís M.B. Cabral
چکیده

Article history: In a framework of repeatedReceived 12 April 2007 Received in revised form 2 July 2008 Accepted 10 July 2008 Available online 17 July 2008

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تاریخ انتشار 2008