Worries over bioterrorism push

A decision taken with the intention of protecting society against attack by biological weapons could, perversely, increase the very same danger. That is the implication of a debate now raging in the USA over the support of research on pathogens that might be used by terrorists. An alleged shift in funding in the wake of the 9/11 disaster and the ‘anthrax letters’ sent during 2001 means that more laboratories are now working on highly hazardous organisms. In consequence there are greater risks that such pathogens may be released accidentally or be acquired deliberately by terrorists. The shift in financial support is highlighted in a letter in Science (307: 1409 (2005)) signed by over 700 microbiologists and specialists in adjacent disciplines. They argue that the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) peer review process, and the research sector responsible for past achievements in public health, science and biotechnology, are threatened by unintended consequences of a decision by the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) in 2001–2 to prioritise work of high significance for biodefence but low significance for public health. ‘This prioritisation, which was implemented by creation of funding set-asides, special funding review panels, and special funding review procedures, has transformed NIH-supported research in microbial physiology, genetics and pathogenesis,’ the signatories write. ‘The result has been a massive influx of funding, institutions and investigators into work on prioritised bioweapons agents.’ Examples include the organisms that cause anthrax, plague, tularaemia, melioidosis and brucellosis. Over the same period of funding, says the letter, there has been a ‘massive efflux’ of funding, institutions and investigators from non-defence-related work on the same aspects of microbiology. For example, the number of grants awarded for studies on model organisms fell from 490 in 1996–2000 to 289 in 2001–January 2004 — a decline of 41%. ‘The diversion of research funds...represents a misdirection of NIH priorities and a crisis for NIH-supported microbiological research.’ What is unquestionable is that US research on biological weapons agents has increased in recent years. Following 9/11 and the anthrax letters, the Bush administration resolved to boost appropriate work, and Congress quickly approved an NIAID plan to inject extra money into biodefence research, including new laboratories. According to Martin Enserink and Jocelyn Kaiser writing in Science (307, 1398, (2005)), NIH Director Anthony Fauci insists that this year’s $1.7 billion of NIH biodefence spending (most of it at the NIAID) has come on top of existing budgets. The same article cites un-named NIH officials as insisting that the numbers in the microbiologists’ letter are misleading. A major reason is that defence research provides spin-off benefits for other aspects of microbiology and public health. ‘In a vigorous defence of the program...Fauci said he was able to strike a ‘deal’ with the Administration that allows NIAID to spend about one third of the money on basic research and socalled emerging infectious diseases,’ say the authors. The flow and counter-flow of dividends from defence research into ‘civil’ science make it unwise to draw hasty conclusions regarding the concrete outcome of changes in the pattern of funding. From the standpoint of individual scientists, nevertheless, the prioritisation of biodefence work is likely to influence the formulation of research proposals. News focus