Nash implementable domains for the Borda count

نویسندگان

  • Clemens Puppe
  • Attila Tasnádi
چکیده

* We thank József Mala for posing the question of Nash implementability on restricted domains that led to this research. We are very grateful to two anonymous referees and an associate editor for their helpful comments and suggestions. The second author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) through the Bolyai János research fellowship. Summary. We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a " cyclic permutation domain " which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof when combined with every possible tie breaking rule. It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are the " cyclically nested permutation domains " which are obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriately specified recursive way.

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Social Choice and Welfare

دوره 31  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008