Supplement for Identication and Estimation of Games with Incomplete Information Using Excluded Regressors"
نویسندگان
چکیده
This online supplement to Lewbel and Tang (2014) provides proofs and additional results. Section A provides results regarding existence of required sets of states and assumed support conditions. Section B provides further discussion and formal derivations of our asymptotic results, and Section C gives the proof of Theorem 3. This section provides further primitive conditions on model elements that are su¢ cient for some of the identifying conditions in the text. These include the existence of a non-degenerate and non-singular (n.d.s.) set for a given ~ x; and the large support condition in A4 and A4'. In Section 3.2 of Lewbel and Tang (2014), we give conditions under which there exists a n.d.s. set for a generic vector of non-excluded regressors ~ x. Here in this section we give stronger conditions that ensure there exists a n.d.s. set ! where the equilibrium is unique. This is useful for the identi…cation strategy discussed in Section 7.1 of Lewbel and Tang (2014). Consider a game with N = 2 (with players denoted by 1 and 2) and h i (D j) = D j for i = 1; 2 and j = 3 i. To begin with, we give conditions under which the game admits a unique equilibrium at a generic state x. Let p (p 1 ; p 2) and de…ne:
منابع مشابه
Identication and Estimation of Discrete Bayesian Games with Multiple Equilibria Using Excluded Regressors1
We establish the nonparametric point identi cation of simultaneous discrete games with incomplete information, allowing for multiple equilibria. Our approach exploits the identifying power from a set of player-speci c states that: (a) are additively separable from an individual players payo¤ and excluded from those of others; (b) do not a¤ect the interaction e¤ects among all players; (c) are i...
متن کاملInflation and Inflation Uncertainty in Iran: An Application of GARCH-in-Mean Model with FIML Method of Estimation
This paper investigates the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty for the period of 1990-2009 by using monthly data in the Iranian economy. The results of a two-step procedure such as Granger causality test which uses generated variables from the first stage as regressors in the second stage, suggests a positive relation between the mean and the variance of inflation. However...
متن کاملCournot games with linear regression expectations in oligopolistic markets
In this paper, a Cournot game in an oligopolistic market with incomplete information is considered. The market consists of some producers that compete for getting higher payoffs. For optimal decision making, each player needs to estimate its rivals’ behaviors. This estimation is carried out using linear regression and recursive weighted least-squares method. As the information of each player ab...
متن کاملOptimal (R, Q) policy and pricing for two-echelon supply chain with lead time and retailer’s service-level incomplete information
Many studies focus on inventory systems to analyze different real-world situations. This paper considers a two-echelon supply chain that includes one warehouse and one retailer with stochastic demand and an up-to-level policy. The retailer’s lead time includes the transportation time from the warehouse to the retailer that is unknown to the retailer. On the other hand, the warehouse is unaware ...
متن کاملAPPLICATION OF GAME THEORY IN DYNAMIC COMPETITIVE PRICING WITH ONE PRICE LEADER AND N DEPENDENT FOLLOWERS
In this research UF cheese pricing is considered and Pegah, Pak, Kaleh, Rouzaneh and Mihan firms’ data, as five main UF cheese competitive firms of Iran in breakfast cheese competitive market, is used. By using these firm’s sales data, production data and price of each ton of UF cheese in nineteen work-periods (each work-period is 6 months), their sales equations are estimated for each work-pe...
متن کامل