Bargaining with Optimism
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining with Optimism: Identication and Estimation of a Model of Medical Malpractice Litigation
We study identi cation and estimation of a structural model of bargaining with optimism where players have heterogeneous beliefs about the nal resolution of a dispute if they fail to reach an agreement. We show that the distribution of beliefs of both parties and the stochastic bargaining surplus are nonparametrically identi ed from the probability of settlement and the distribution of transfe...
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