Beliefs and Pareto Efficient Sets: A Remark

A Remark on a Remark by Macaulay or Enhancing Lazard Structural Theorem

Risk Sharing in the Small and in the Large

This paper analyzes risk sharing in economies with no aggregate uncertainty when agents have ambiguity-sensitive preferences that are not necessarily convex, i.e., uncertaintyaverse in the sense of Schmeidler (1989). We consider three notions of “beliefs” for such preferences, and propose a condition under which they coincide. Our main result shows that, under this condition, betting is ineffic...

A Detail-Free and Efficient Auction for Budget Constrained Bidders

Consider an auction for a divisible good where bidders have private budgets. Recent work by Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan (2012) shows there is no individually rational dominant strategy mechanism that implements a Pareto efficient outcome and satisfies weak budget balance when bidders have private budgets. My main result shows that when bidders have full-support beliefs over their rivals’ types, ...

A method of approximating Pareto sets for assessments of implicit Pareto set elements

Deriving efficient variants in complex multiple criteria decision making problems requires optimization. This hampers greatly broad use of any multiple criteria decision making method. In multiple criteria decision making Pareto sets, i.e. sets of efficient vectors of criteria values corresponding to feasible decision alternatives, are of primal interest. Recently, methods have been proposed to...

Some criteria for error bounds in set optimization

We obtain sufficient and/or necessary conditions for global/local error bounds for the distances to some sets appeared in set optimization studied with both the set approach and vector approach (sublevel sets, constraint sets, sets of all Pareto efficient/ Henig proper efficient/super efficient solutions, sets of solutions corresponding to one Pareto efficient/Henig proper efficient/super effic...