Some Problems with Particularism

This article suggests that due to a restricted understanding of the nature and scope of ethical theory, particularism discounts prematurely the possibility of a metatheory of Buddhist ethics. The textual evidence presented in support of particularism is reconsidered and shown to be consistent with a metatheoretical reading. It is argued that writers who have adopted a particularist approach based on W. D. Ross’s “Principalism”—such as Tessa Bartholomeusz in her study of just war ideology in Sri Lanka—have failed to give a satisfactory analysis of the moral dilemmas they have identified. Although particularism rightly draws attention to stories as important sources of moral data, it fails to disprove that the diversity of such evidence can be explained by a single comprehensive theory. While writing this article I heard that scientists in the field of nuclear physics had successfully concluded their search for the “god particle.” This mysterious particle known as the “Higgs boson” is thought to provide pivotal evidence regarding what is known as the “standard theory” 1 Goldsmiths College, University of London. E-mail: [email protected]. Keown, Some Problems with Particularism 446 of matter and to provide the key to unlock the secrets of the universe. As I listened to this news I found myself thinking how convenient it would be if there was something like a Higgs boson in the field of Buddhist ethics, namely some piece of evidence or data that would confirm one or other of the standard theories which have been proposed to date. It may be, of course, that no one theory is comprehensive enough to explain all the data and that the search for a “standard theory” of Buddhist ethics is misconceived. This suggestion was first proposed some time ago by Charles Hallisey in an influential article in the Journal of Buddhist Ethics (“Ethical Particularism in Theravada Buddhism”). This prompted a response by Kevin Schilbrack (“ The General and the Particular in Theravada Ethics: A Response to Charles Hallisey”), and a rejoinder from Hallisey (“A Response to Kevin Schilbrack”), and now rather belatedly I want to pick up the conversation again. My interest in the topic was reawakened when writing about the notion of just war in Buddhism (forthcoming), and re-reading the late Tessa Bartholomeusz’s excellent study of just war ideology in Sri Lanka (In Defence of Dharma) that draws quite heavily on the theory of ethical particularism. This revealed how influential the theory has become and because my own reflections on the notion of just war were taking a different direction it seemed important to revisit the idea of particularism in order to make clear where, as I see it, Bartholomeusz goes astray in applying this line of thought to Buddhist justifications for war. Bartholomeusz draws on references to war in Buddhist narratives and stories, such as the fifth-century Mahāvaṃsa, and combines them with Hallisey’s reflections on “particularism” in Theravāda Buddhism and W. D. Ross’s concept of prima facie duties to construct a Buddhist theory of just war or dharma yuddhaya. She writes, “I find useful Ross’s language of prima facie responsibilities, and Hallisey’s expression of them” (26). And later: “As this study on just-war ideology in Buddhist Sri 447 Journal of Buddhist Ethics Lanka suggests so far, viewing Theravādin Buddhist ethics through both pluralism and the lens of prima facie duties, rather than only assuming a single ethical principle (such as pacifism), permits complicated readings of primary actors in religious stories” (29). Bartholomeusz is here setting up a contrast between what she regards as a flexible, nuanced and pluralist approach that is faithful to indigenous sources, in contrast to a rigid, monolithic (Western) one of the kind a metatheorist such as myself might be thought to prefer. However, I think this is a false dichotomy that arises from confusion about the nature of ethical theory, and that a metatheory is as capable of offering as nuanced and flexible an interpretation of Buddhist ethics as a ‘no theory’ view. I will try to explain why by first of all summarizing my understanding of ethical particularism. Ethical Particularism Charles Hallisey believes that a variety of moral theories can be identified in Theravāda Buddhism, and suggests that scholars who have sought to explain Buddhist ethics by reference to a single comprehensive theory have been asking the wrong question. He thinks that the question “Is there a moral theory in Theravāda Buddhism” has “distorted our perception of Theravādin ethics” because “its practitioners and intellectuals have resorted to more than one kind of moral theory.” The search for a single unifying theory is misconceived, Hallisey believes, because “we realize that there can be no answer to a question that asks us to discover which family of ethical theory underlies Buddhist ethics in general, simply because Buddhists availed themselves of and argued over a variety of moral theories” (“Ethical” 37). We can certainly agree that the stories in Buddhist literature provide evidence that Buddhists, like everyone else, have puzzled over and argued about the right thing to do in a given set of circumstances. Keown, Some Problems with Particularism 448 Stories all over the world, from sagas to soap-operas, explore conflicts among moral values and principles. The conflict between love and duty, for example, takes many forms, and arises again and again in numerous cultures and contexts, as does the conflict between justice and mercy. I suggest it is mistaken, however, to characterize the stories in which these conflicts are explored as debates about moral theories. Theories operate at a higher level of abstraction and generality. Typically, they are formed though an intermediate process of casuistry whereby problematic situations of the kind found in stories are grouped and compared in order to derive moral principles. These principles are then ordered by moral theories, which seek to offer comprehensive explanation and justification as an aid in the resolution of similar moral dilemmas when they arise in future. Stories are thus the raw data from which ethical principles and theories are refined. Particularists, therefore, go too far in presenting the moral dilemmas in stories as evidence of Buddhists disagreeing over moral theories, and so far as I am aware, no moral theories have yet been elaborated in Buddhist sources. The nearest approach to ethical theory in Buddhism can be seen in the Vinaya where cases are grouped together under rubrics in the manner of casuistry but without progressing to the stage of fully-fledged theory.