Extremist Funding, Centrist Voters, and Candidate Divergence
نویسنده
چکیده
SFI WORKING PAPER: 1997-06-059 SFI Working Papers contain accounts of scientific work of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Santa Fe Institute. We accept papers intended for publication in peer-reviewed journals or proceedings volumes, but not papers that have already appeared in print. Except for papers by our external faculty, papers must be based on work done at SFI, inspired by an invited visit to or collaboration at SFI, or funded by an SFI grant. ©NOTICE: This working paper is included by permission of the contributing author(s) as a means to ensure timely distribution of the scholarly and technical work on a non-commercial basis. Copyright and all rights therein are maintained by the author(s). It is understood that all persons copying this information will adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright. These works may be reposted only with the explicit permission of the copyright holder. www.santafe.edu
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