Padding attacks on RSA
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper presents a non-technical overview of the the recent attacks against RSA encryption and signature standards. It is intended as both a system design aid and a temporary reference text beginning at a level suitable for engineers, risk managers and system architects with no or little previous exposure to padding attacks. We have used a straightforward approach to the essential consequences of each attack, coupled with a pragmatic in-depth selection of some of the most popular padding schemes.
منابع مشابه
Side-Channel Attacks on Textbook RSA and ElGamal Encryption
This paper describes very efficient attacks on plain RSA encryption as usually described in textbooks. These attacks exploit side channels caused by implementations that, during decryption, incorrectly make certain assumption on the size of message. We highlight different assumptions that are easily made when implementing plain RSA decryption and present corresponding attacks. These attacks mak...
متن کاملUniversal Padding Schemes for RSA
A common practice to encrypt with RSA is to first apply a padding scheme to the message and then to exponentiate the result with the public exponent; an example of this is OAEP. Similarly, the usual way of signing with RSA is to apply some padding scheme and then to exponentiate the result with the private exponent, as for example in PSS. Usually, the RSA modulus used for encrypting is differen...
متن کاملPreventing Active Timing Attacks in Low-Latency Anonymous Communication
Low-latency anonymous communication protocols in general, and the popular onion-routing protocol in particular, are broken against simple timing attacks. While there have been few proposed solutions to this problem when the adversary is active, several padding schemes have been proposed to defend against a passive adversary that just observes timing patterns. Unfortunately active adversaries ca...
متن کاملMaking RSA-PSS Provably Secure against Non-random Faults
RSA–CRT is the most widely used implementation for RSA signatures. However, deterministic and many probabilistic RSA signatures based on CRT are vulnerable to fault attacks. Nevertheless, Coron and Mandal (Asiacrypt 2009) show that the randomized PSS padding protects RSA signatures against random faults. In contrast, Fouque et al. (CHES 2012) show that PSS padding does not protect against certa...
متن کاملFault Attacks on RSA Signatures with Partially Unknown Messages
Fault attacks exploit hardware malfunctions to recover secrets from embedded electronic devices. In the late 90’s, Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton [6] introduced fault-based attacks on crt-rsa. These attacks factor the signer’s modulus when the message padding function is deterministic. However, the attack does not apply when the message is partially unknown, for example when it contains some randomn...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Inf. Sec. Techn. Report
دوره 4 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1999