Finding the unity in Dewey through Heidegger

Dewey openly admitted that he had not achieved systematic unity in his philosophy, even though it had been a goal of his to develop a coherent philosophy of experience. This lack of systematic unity is encountered in the equivocal nature of much of the interrelation amongst his many arguments and terms resulting in frustration for many, a frustration that may have hindered a deeper understanding of his efforts to promulgate a different way of conceiving our experience. Heidegger is another philosopher who brings frustration to many, especially in relation to his esoteric terminology. But beyond this frustration there are many similarities between the philosophies of Heidegger and Dewey. The efforts Heidegger made in his early work to describe the character of his philosophizing offer an insight into a method which maintains the unity from its beginnings. This beginning with unity that enables the preservation of unity is held up in contrast to Dewey’s philosophic method which, while professing the unity and integrity of experience, begins with a subtle distinction in experience that conceals the possibility of a unified beginning. Dewey is left to construct his system using the various fragments he has uncovered of a unity that Heidegger is able to maintain throughout his philosophizing. Unity as Systematic and Historical In a reflective piece written in response to a range of critics, Dewey (1939, p. 523) made reference to ‘my philosophical system’. ‘I did not hit upon my position as a ready made and finished doctrine’, he (p. 521) revealed. ‘It developed in and through a series of reactions to a number of philosophic problems and doctrines’ (p. 521). ‘Inconsistencies and shifts have taken place’, he (p. 520) admitted; ‘the most I can claim is that I have moved fairly steadily in one direction’. In a further confession Dewey (p. 554) claimed that he had ‘failed to develop in a systematic way my underlying psychological principles’. And in an earlier statement Dewey disclosed his doubts about his ever attaining systematic unity. ‘Although I have not the aversion to system as such that is sometimes attributed to me’, he (1930, p. 21) remarked, ‘I am dubious of my own ability to reach inclusive systematic unity, and in consequence, perhaps, of that fact, also dubious about my contemporaries’. Having acknowledged the difficulty, Dewey (1985, p. 21) continued to believe that ‘the boundless multiplicity of the concrete experiences of humanity when dealt with gently and humanely, will naturally terminate in some sense of the structure of any and all experience’. And while Dewey believed that he had not achieved systematic in his description of the structure of experience, a ‘sound philosophy of experience’ remained a goal of Dewey’s (1938a, p. 91) work. As a consequence of these admissions, one could claim that achieving a systematic understanding of Dewey’s philosophy of experience would present a gargantuan, if not impossible task. If Dewey had not achieved it, how could anyone else? However systematic unity is not only achieved by searching amongst an assortment of fragments. Unity can also be found in the way the question is asked and investigated in the beginning. It was in this way that Dewey’s work could be informed by Heidegger, another philosopher who was centrally concerned with experience. In one of his first published series of lectures, delivered in 1919, Heidegger (2000, p. 53) presented an ‘analysis of the structure of experience’. In these lectures Heidegger revealed an understanding of the term experience in its broad association with life, a conception also held by Dewey. ‘We use the word life to denote the whole range of experience’, Dewey (1916, p. 2) remarked. ‘“Life” covers customs, institutions, beliefs, victories and defeats, recreations and occupations. We employ the word “experience” in the same pregnant sense’ (p. 2). As such, Dewey (p. 2) often joined the two terms, referring to ‘life-experience’. Heidegger similarly associated life with experience, although at the same time he acknowledged problems with the way in which this composite term was construed. Heidegger (2000, p. © 2007 The Author 2 Conference Presentation © 2007 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia 55) opined that ‘the term “lived experience” is today so faded and worn thin that, if it were not so fitting, it would be best to leave it aside. Since it cannot be avoided, it is all the more necessary to understand its