Judicial integrity: the accountability gap and the Bangalore Principles

The judiciary needs to be independent of outside influence, particularly from political and economic powers. But judicial independence does not mean that judges and court officials should have free rein to behave as they please. Indeed, judicial independence is founded on public trust, and to maintain it, judges must uphold the highest standards of integrity. This chapter focuses on the accountability mechanisms that safeguard judicial integrity. Greg Mayne looks at the failure of the international community to address judicial accountability, and maps out various national and international initiatives that seek to plug this gap, notably the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. Emilio Cárdenas and Héctor Chayer address the question of judicial discipline in Latin America, and ask who should sanction corrupt or incompetent judges. If the judiciary is accountable to an outside body, there is a danger that it could undermine judicial independence. If the judiciary develops internal accountability mechanisms, issues are raised as to the legitimacy of such self-regulation and its transparency. A pair of essays looks at the professionalisation and training of judges and their influence on judicial integrity. Vincent Yang and Linda Ehrichs consider corruption in the judiciaries of Asia and explain how judges’ education, salaries and career structures impact on their integrity. Carlo Guarnieri examines the judicial training and appointments regime in three European civil law systems (Germany, France and Italy) and compares their propensity for maintaining judicial integrity. Finally, Zora Ledergerber, Gretta Fenner and Mark Pieth look at the repercussions of weak national judicial accountability mechanisms for the international legal system, most notably for the effective implementation of the UNCAC provisions that deal with the recovery and repatriation of stolen assets.