Singular Propositions in Two-Stage Theory

In traditional possible-worlds semantics the meaning, or intension, of an atomic empirical sentence is given as a proposition, whereby a proposition is modelled as a mapping from possible worlds to truth-values. Call such propositions ‘PWS (ie possible-worlds semantic) propositions.’ This notion of proposition, however, has been rightly found to be too coarse to handle propositional and notional attitude as well as mathematical-logical contexts, since the principle of individuation of such propositions is no finer than logical equivalence. Consequently, a section of contemporary philosophy of language is characterized by a quest for hyperintensions. Hyperintensions, intuitively, are modes of presentation of intensions and extensions (and other hyperintensions). The need for finer degrees of propositional granularity has been accommodated by various notions of structured proposition containing objects such as individuals as constituents. Joseph Almog, among the founding fathers of so-called two-stage theory, gives the logical nature of what he considers structured propositions as ordered n-tuples. His position, characterizing itself as ‘broadly Russellian’ and anti-Fregean, sees itself as a reaction against both Fregean reliance on individual concepts to the exclusion of individuals per se and Kripke’s blurring the distinction between proper names and rigidified definite descriptions (such as ‘the actual F’).