How do Executives Exercise Stock Options?∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze a large data set of stock option exercises for a large data set of almost 200,000 option packages for more than 16,000 US top executives and analyze their motivations for the early exercise of their stock options. We estimate a hazard model to identify the main variables that in uence executives' timing decisions and nd that behavioral factors (e.g., trends in past stock prices), institutional factors (vesting dates, grant dates, blackout periods) and inside information strongly in uence the timing of stock option exercises. By contrast, we nd little support for the in uence of variables proposed by utility-based models.
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تاریخ انتشار 2008