A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper uses the Clarke mechanism to construct an incentive compatible tâtonnement process which converges to the Lindahl allocation of a public good economy. We show truth telling is an equilibrium in the infinite horizon game induced by the tâtonnement. JEL Codes: C72, D44, H41
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 43 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014