Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results
نویسندگان
چکیده
Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on mergingand splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments. JEL classification: C71, D23, D71.
منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 41 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012