Gender Effects in Private Value Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
In a two-stage auction women are significantly more likely to go bankrupt than men, bidding more aggressively than the men in both phases of the auction process. JEL classification: J16, D44
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تاریخ انتشار 2006