Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
نویسنده
چکیده
I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced. JEL Classification: D44; D82; D72
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 153 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014