CS 269 I : Incentives in Computer Science Lecture # 15 : The VCG Mechanism ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
First we prove the important result stated last lecture about sponsored search auctions. Recall the setup: there are k slots with click-through-rates (CTRs) α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αk, and each bidder i = 1, 2, . . . , n has a private valuation per-click vi. (Bids and prices are also per-click.) Our first attempt to generalize the Vickrey auction to sponsored search results in the “Generalized Second Price (GSP)” auction, where each bidder pays the bid of the nexthighest bidder (per-click).
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