Effects of Antitrust Leniency on Concealment Effort by Colluding Firms∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide an economic analysis of the incentives created by an antitrust leniency program, with particular attention to incentives created for effort directed at the concealment of collusion. The results point to a need for competition authorities to consider the effects of concealment when evaluating economic evidence of collusion. The results also suggest possible benefits from increasing penalties for cartels that use third-party facilitators.
منابع مشابه
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