On Individual and Social Rights

The debate about the status and purpose of individual rights as against social rights depends a great deal on how we define these terms. Although it is difficult to come to a definitive philosophical or jurisprudential conclusion about social versus individual rights, textbooks on human rights recognize the difference between the two traditions (Gearon 2003). Furthermore, the difference between these two traditions is consequential in the real world. For example the so-called twin covenants embrace this distinction. There is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was promulgated on December 16, 1966, and came into effect on March 23, 1976. There is the parallel International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which was promulgated on December 16, 1966, and came into effect on January 3, 1976. The ICCPR is often seen to embrace the classic liberal “negative freedoms,” namely a set of rights that are “freedom-from rights,” essentially freedom from oppression. By contrast, the ICESCR is regarded as embracing those rights and entitlements that have underpinned welfare systems in both liberal democracies and socialist regimes. They are the “positive freedoms” that provide people in need with resources to achieve certain desirable outcomes. These two covenants became somewhat entangled in cold war ideological conflicts between liberal capitalist democracies and socialist states. The controversial nature of the two covenants is illustrated by the fact that, while they were presented to the UN General Assembly in 1966, it took a further decade before they could be ratified in order for them to come into operation. It is often said that, while the West has recognized the ICCPR because it is compatible with liberal ideology, socialist states have felt more comfortable with the