Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation∗
We consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, onedimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. The short proof is based on a...
متن کاملBayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model
We prove—in the standard independent private-values model—that the outcome, in terms of expected probabilities of trade and expected transfers, of any Bayesian mechanism, can also be obtained with a dominant-strategy mechanism.
متن کاملOn the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities∗
We extend the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation established by Gershkov et al. (Econometrica, 2013) to environments with non-linear utilities satisfying the property of increasing differences over distributions and the convex-valued assumption. The new equivalence result produces novel implications to the literature on the principal-agent problem with allocative ...
متن کاملDominant Strategy Implementation of Bayesian incentive Compatible Allocation Rules*
A large literature on incentive mechanisms represents incentive constraints by the requirement that truthful reporting be a Bayesian equilibrium. This paper identifies mechanism design problems for which there is no loss in replacing Bayesian incentive compatibility by the stronger requirement of dominant strategies. We identify contexts where it is possible to change the transfer payments of a...
متن کاملOn the Equivalence Between Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation: The Case of Correlated Types
We consider general social choice environments with private values and correlated types. Each agent’s matrix of conditional probabilities satisfies the full rank condition. We show that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities to all agents and generates at least the same soc...
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