Full-Truthful Implementation in Nash Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider full-truthful Nash implementation, which requires truth telling by each agent to be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelationmechanism, and every Nash equilibrium outcome of the mechanism to be f optimal. We show that restricted monotonicity plus an auxiliary condition is necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation, and that full-truthful Nash implementation is equivalent to secure implementation (Saijo et al. (2007)). The equivalence gives us an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice functions in terms of restricted monotonicity.
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