Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
The simultaneous ascending auction has proved to be a successful method of auctioning many related items. Simultaneous sale and ascending bids promote price discovery, which helps bidders build desirable packages of items. Although package bids are not allowed, the auction format does handle mild complementarities well. I examine the auction design and its performance in practice.
منابع مشابه
A comparison of multi-object auction formats
We compare the performance of three alternative multi-object auction institutions: simultaneous ascending auctions with the hard closing rule, simultaneous ascending auctions with the soft closing rule, and simultaneous first price sealed bid auctions. Among the three formats, the simultaneous ascending auction with the soft closing rule is the most efficient and produces outcomes closest to th...
متن کاملCollusion or Sniping in simultaneous ascending Auctions
In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo (2002) derive collusive equilibria where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the Hard Close auction format, a prisoner’s dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do no longer exist, even fo...
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In simultaneous ascending price auctions with heterogeneous goods Brusco and Lopomo [2002] derive collusive equilibria, where bidders divide objects among themselves, while keeping the prices low. Considering a simultaneous ascending price auction with a fixed deadline, i.e. the hard close auction format, a prisoner’s dilemma situation results and collusive equilibria do not longer exist, even ...
متن کاملSimultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions
We analyze simultaneous ascending bid auctions with multiple objects in which bidders can be budget constrained. The presence of budget constraints shrinks the equilibrium set. A family of equilibria with a high degree of competition, as well as a family of equilibria with a high degree of collusion, disappear. When the budget available to each bidder is private information then even a very sma...
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تاریخ انتشار 2004