Corrigendum to "Bargaining and boldness": [Games and Economic Behavior 38 (2002) 28-51]
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show the incompatibility between the existence of stationary subgame perfect equilibria in Shaked’s game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown and the behavior of players consistent with the Allais Paradox. Thus, the strategic support of the equally marginally bold solution presented in Burgos, Grant, and Kajii [2002. Games Econ. Behav. 38, 28–51] does not go beyond the two-person case. 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; C78; D81
منابع مشابه
Bargaining and Boldness
We study a multiperson bargaining problem with general risk preferences through the use of Shaked’s game of cycling offers with exogenous breakdown. If preferences are “smooth,” then as the risk of breakdown vanishes, the limiting outcome is one in which bargainers are equally marginally bold; where a bargainer’s marginal boldness measures his willingness to risk disagreement in return for a ma...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 41 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002