Elite Incorporation in Multi-Ethnic Societies

Under what conditions are political parties, ethnic, non-ethnic or multi-ethnic, able to incorporate elites from rising ethnic categories and retain their allegiance? General theories of party politics in multi-ethnic societies propose a sociological answer to this question, according to which success or failure in elite incorporation is determined by the pattern of conflict or harmony between ethnic categories in society. I propose here an institutionalist model, according to which success or failure in elite incorporation depends, not upon the social relations between ethnic categories, but upon the internal organizational structure of political parties. Given an equal probability of winning elections, political parties with competitive rules for intra-party advancement, I argue, are likely to incorporate new elites successfully, while political parties with centralized rules are likely to fail. And competitive party organizations with even a low probability of winning elections are likely to be more able to incorporate new elites than centralized party organizations with a higher probability. The model builds upon Myron Weiner’s classic 1967 study of the Congress party, which was the first to identify the link between intra-party competition and elite incorporation. I develop the model by reexamining Weiner’s and other studies in the light of new data from a study of the variation in the ability of the Congress Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party to incorporate Scheduled Caste elites across Indian states. Apart from the literature on ethnic politics, the model has implications for two distinct theoretical literatures. It offers a foundation for explanations of India’s democratic “exceptionalism”, which is one of the main preoccupations of the literature on democratic stability; and it offers an explanation for India’s “Duvergerian exceptionalism”, which is one of the main preoccupations of the literature on party and electoral systems. Chandra/Elite Incorporation in Multi-Ethnic Societies 2 Elite Incorporation in Multi-Ethnic Societies Kanchan Chandra Under what conditions are political parties in multi-ethnic societies able to incorporate elites from rising ethnic categories and retain their allegiance? General theories of party politics in multi-ethnic societies offer a sociological explanation in response to this question. The composition of political parties in ethnically divided societies, according to these theories, is a straightforward reflection of the pattern of conflict in society. Where ethnic categories are in conflict in society, elites belonging to these categories will not be able to coexist in the same political party. Multi-ethnic parties that attempt to bring these elites together under the same umbrella, according to these theories, are therefore “inherently unstable.” Conversely, elites from the same ethnic category, or from categories in social harmony, are posited to be more capable of co-existing in the same political party. Ethnic parties, therefore, which bring together elites from a single ethnic category, or from several ethnic categories which are not in conflict, are likely to enjoy a more stable existence. This article proposes an institutionalist model of elite incorporation which is explicitly at odds with the sociological explanation proposed above. I argue here that the successful incorporation of elites by political parties, whether multiethnic, non-ethnic or ethnic, depends upon the internal organizational structure of the party. Parties with competitive rules for intra-party advancement are able to continually incorporate new elites, while keeping old ones acquiescent. Such parties are stable parties, better able to retain the allegiance of elites during “lean” periods when they are out of government. Parties with centralized rules of intra-party advancement, however, are “closed” to the entry of new elites. Such parties are unstable, deeply vulnerable to defections by old elites when they are out of power. The effect of the internal organizational structure is stronger than the degree of conflict between ethnic groups in society. Where a competitive structure exists, it promotes coexistence even between elites from warring groups in the same party. Where a centralized organizational structure exists, however, we are likely to see splits and defections by elites from initially harmonious categories or even from the same ethnic category. The model builds upon Myron Weiner’s classic study of the Congress party, published in 1967, which was among the first to identify the link between intra-party competition and the incorporation of new elites. Other studies of the Congress party have developed this link and demonstrated its applicability in a variety of empirical contexts. I derive the argument here by reexamining this rich literature in light of new data from a comparative study of the variation in the ability of the Congress Party and the Bahujan Samaj Party to incorporate Scheduled Caste elites across Indian states. 1 I am grateful to the SSRC-Macarthur Program on International Peace and Security and the Harvard Academy for International and Area studies for fellowship support during the research and writing of this article and the dissertation of which it is a part. For their comments on earlier versions, I would like to thank Paul Brass, Samuel Huntington, David Laitin, Richard Sisson, Ashutosh Varshney and the participants at the festschrift in honour of Myron Weiner at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, September 24-26 1999. Discussions with Robert Bates and James Fearon were more important in helping me think about the problem of elite incorporation than they might imagine. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the conclusions presented here. 2 Rabushka and Shepsle (1972); Horowitz (1985). 3 Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), 82. 4 In particular, see Brass (1965); Nayar (1966); and Sisson (1972). Chandra/Elite Incorporation in Multi-Ethnic Societies 3 The article is organized as follows: Section I defines the key terms used in the article. Section II models the difference in the capacity of competitive and centralized party organizations to incorporate new elites. Section III applies this model to explaining the variation in patterns of incorporation of Scheduled Caste elites by the Congress and the BSP across the three Indian states of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Karnataka. Section IV, the conclusion, explores the implications of the argument proposed here for the scholarship on democratic stability and on party and electoral systems. I. Definitions By the term ‘ethnic identity’ I mean nominal membership in ascriptive categories including race, language, caste, or religion. Such nominal membership is inherited. However, we are usually born with a choice of membership in several groups. As used here, the term ethnic ‘group’ does not imply active participation in a common group identity. Wherever possible, therefore, I use the term ethnic ‘category’ rather than ‘group’ to emphasize this point. By an ethnic party I mean a party that markets itself to voters as the champion of the interests of one ethnic group or set of groups to the exclusion of another or others, and makes such an appeal central to its mobilizing strategy. As defined here, an ethnic party may champion the interests of more than one category. What then distinguishes an ethnic from a multi-ethnic party? The main distinction does not lie in the number of categories that each attempts to represent. If we look at any ethnic category closely, we will see that it is usually an amalgam of others, and so any party speaking for one category can simultaneously be seen as speaking for several. The key distinction between an ethnic and a multi-ethnic party, therefore, is not the number of category that each includes in its appeal but in whether or not there is a category that each attempts to exclude. An ethnic party, regardless of how many categories it claims to speak for, always identifies clearly the category that is excluded. A multi-ethnic party, while also invoking ethnic identities, does not identify a clear outsider group. By the term elites I mean simply “modern men”, urbanized, better educated, and economically better off than the rest of the population. I take as my starting point a society characterized by differential modernization between and within ethnic categories. In most multiethnic societies, some ethnic categories in these societies modernize earlier than others. Within any single category, furthermore, individuals modernize at different rates. Rather than witnessing the modernization of the entire category at once, therefore, we see the emergence of an upper layer of elites who then act as brokers for the interests of the less modernized members of their ethnic category. The drive for political office is confined mainly to this elite layer within each ethnic category. Political party organizations are initially dominated by elites from the early modernizing category or categories. I term these elites “old elites.” Subsequent waves of modernization produce “new elites” from previously passive groups who then demand political offices in their own right. II. Elite Incorporation in Competitive v/s Centralized Party Organizations I assume that new and old elites from any ethnic category are motivated by the desire to obtain political office in the long term and are instrumentally rational. They may desire office for 5 This is consistent with the definition proposed in Horowitz (1985). 6 For a somewhat similar definition, see Horowitz (1985), p. 299. Horowitz too argues that an ethnic party can comprise of more than one ethnic group. A party should be termed multi-ethnic, according to him, “only if it spans the major groups in conflict.” (299). The problem with this definition is that conflict between ethnic groups is often not prior to but created during the process of political mobilization. 7 Bates (1983), Brass (1974) Chandra/Elite Incorporation in Multi-Ethnic Societies 4 material resources or psychic satisfaction or both, but will affiliate themselves with that political party which promises them the best chance of obtaining office in the long term. New elites, faced with a choice between political parties, will join that one which gives the best long-term chance of obtaining office. Elites already entrenched in any political party organization, faced with a decision about whether to remain or to defect, will also choose that party which maximizes their chances for obtaining office in the long term. For any individual elite, the expected probability of obtaining office through any given political party is the product of two independent probabilities: 1) The probability of the party’s winning an election in the long term, which affects in turn the number of offices at its disposal and 2) The probability of their obtaining a position in the party organization high enough to guarantee them one of the limited offices. Equation I below represents this calculation: EP(Off) = P(Win)*P(Org) EP(Off) represents the expected probability of obtaining office in the long term; P(Win) the probability of the party’s winning the election in the long term; and P(Org) the probability of obtaining a suitable position in the party organization for any individual elite. For new elites, P (Org) is a measure of how high they can expect to rise within the party organization. For old elites already in positions of power in the party, P(Org) is a measure of how much they can count on recapturing their position if they are displaced. It is clear from the equation above that political parties which have a high value of P(Org) can afford to have a low value on P(Win). In other words, political parties which offer new elites a high probability of ascent within the organization and old elites a high probability of return but have a low probability of winning can be as attractive to each set of elites as political parties with a high chance of winning but a low probability of ascent within the ranks or return to old positions. The intractability of the problem of elite incorporation should be immediately obvious. In order to incorporate new elites while retaining the allegiance of old ones, a political party must promise both a high value on P(Org) simultaneously. In other words, it must promise new elites a high probability of ascent within the organization; and old elites a high probability of retaining their positions or advancing to higher ones. This appears on the face of it to be impossible. The number of posts in any political party is limited. Promising new elites access to these posts necessarily threatens their previous occupants with displacement. How is it possible for political parties to simultaneously satisfy both old occupants and new aspirants? This is the essence of the problem of elite incorporation. The problem above may be restated as a variant of a collective action dilemma. In many multi-ethnic democracies, the success of political parties in attracting the support of voters from any ethnic category depends directly upon their ability to incorporate office-seeking elites from this target category. Most party personnel, furthermore, are typically aware of this link between elite incorporation and electoral success. If it is clear that the electoral success of the party depends upon elite incorporation, then rational office-seekers within each political party should take steps to incorporate these elites. However, what is rational for the party as a whole is not rational for individual office-seekers within the party. The incorporation of new elites usually means the displacement of those who already hold positions of power in the party organization and are therefore first in line for the spoils of victory. And so office-seeking elites already entrenched within the party organization are likely be free riders, cheering for incorporation of new elites in the party as a whole, but resisting the incorporation of new elites in their own party 8 I develop this general hypothesis in Chandra (2000b). Chandra/Elite Incorporation in Multi-Ethnic Societies 5 units. In this situation, we should expect localized resistance by each elite individually to prevent the process of elite incorporation, even though this costs the party the election and each is worse off individually than if the party had won. The ability of any party to incorporate new elites successfully depends, therefore, on the invention of a mechanism circumvents the collective action problem by tying the individual interests of office-seekers within the party to the incorporation of new elites. The introduction of competitive rules for intra-party advancement, as I will show below, provides one such mechanism. Competitive rules of intra-party advancement induce elite incorporation by forcing those elites already entrenched in the party apparatus to recruit new elites if they are to safeguard their own positions. At the same time, they prevent the displacement of old elites by creating a system of alternation, so that those displaced have a stable expectation of returning. Party organizations where posts are allotted through competition, therefore, permit elite incorporation into a party with even a low probability of winning. A centralized internal structure, however, prevents elite incorporation by divorcing the incentives for those elites already entrenched within the party organization from the recruitment of new ones. Party organizations where posts are allotted through centralized coordination, therefore, are closed to new entrants even when they have a high probability of winning the election. The remainder of this section develops this argument. Ia Competitive Party Organizations At the initial point, imagine a political party organization dominated by elites from the single ethnic category A, the earliest ethnic category to modernize. Competition within the party takes the form of factions within Group A. Outside the party, in the larger society, lie Category B and Category C. Category B is modernizing at a rate faster than group C and is therefore the primary source of new elites (B1 and B2) looking for an entry into the political system. STAGE I: PARTY DOMINATED BY ELITES FROM GROUP A