Binding Agreements II: Coalition Formation
نویسنده
چکیده
The bargaining approach can be usefully applied to address some classical questions in cooperative game theory. One of these concerns the formation of coalitions and the writing of binding agreements among groups of players. Many years ago, Ronald Coase argued that such negotiations would invariably end in an efficient outcome, and that bargaining power — whatever that is — would be reflected in the allocation of the surplus from that efficient outcome across the different players.
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