Efficiency in coalition games with externalities
نویسنده
چکیده
A natural extension of superadditivity is not sufficient to imply that the grand coalition is efficient when externalities are present. We provide a condition, analogous to convexity, that is sufficient for the grand coalition to be efficient and show that this also implies that the (appropriately defined) core is nonempty. Moreover, we propose a mechanism which implements the most efficient partition for all coalition formation games and characterizes the resulting payoff division. © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; C72; D62
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 61 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007