Are Market-Share Contracts a Poor Man’s Exclusive Dealing?
نویسندگان
چکیده
Contracts that reference rivals have long been a focus of antitrust law and the subject of intense scholarly debate. This paper compares two such contracts, exclusive-dealing contracts and market-share contracts, in a model of naked exclusion. We discuss the different mechanisms through which each works and identify the fundamental tradeoff that arises: marketshare contracts are better at maximizing a seller’s benefit from foreclosure whereas exclusive dealing is better at minimizing a seller’s cost of foreclosure. We give settings in which each is the more profitable contract and show that welfare can be worse with market-share contracts. JEL Classification: L13, L41, L42, K21, D86
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