Social Commitment Delegation and Monitoring
نویسندگان
چکیده
The success of contract-based multiagent systems relies on agents complying with their commitments. When something goes wrong, it is important to understand what are the commitments’ mutual relations as well as their individual states. Accordingly, we explore how commitments are related through the three-agent commitment delegation operation. We then propose exception monitoring based on such relations, and demonstrate it via a case study.
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