The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics
نویسنده
چکیده
Logit-response dynamics [AFN10] are a rich and natural class of noisy bestresponse dynamics. In this work we revise the price of anarchy and the price of stability by considering the quality of long-run equilibria in these dynamics. Our results show that prior studies on simpler dynamics of this type can strongly depend on a synchronous schedule of the players’ moves. In particular, a small noise by itself is not enough to improve the quality of equilibria as soon as other very natural schedules are used.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1512.04017 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015