Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional Types
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference domains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the underlying allocation rule.
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