14 . 12 Game Theory Lecture
نویسنده
چکیده
In these notes, we’ll discuss the repeated games, the games where a particular smaller game is repeated; the small game is called the stage game. The stage game is repeated regardless of what has been played in the previous games. For our analysis, it is important whether the game is repeated finitely or infinitely many times, and whether the players observe what each player has played in each previous game.
منابع مشابه
14 . 12 Game Theory Lecture Notes Lectures
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