A decomposition of strategy-proofness
نویسندگان
چکیده
Strategy-proofness has been one of the central axioms in the theory of social choice. We find that strategy-proofness is decomposed into three axioms: top-restricted AM-proofness, weak monotonicity, and individual bounded response. Among them, individual bounded respose is not as defensible as the other two, and we present possibility results by excluding individual bounded response from strategy-proofness. One of the results supports the plurality rule which is the most widely used rule in practice.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 47 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2016