Unrecognized States: A Theory of Self-Determination and Foreign Influence

The persistence of unrecognized states as territorial units is both intellectually puzzling and normatively problematic. Unrecognized are characterized by stagnant or crumbling economies and instability on their borders, often serve as havens for illicit trade, and challenge the territorial sovereignty of recognized states. Nonetheless, unrecognized statehood can be a remarkably stable outcome, persisting for decades. This paper uses a four player, game theoretic framework to examine the mechanisms that sustain these stalemates and leverages this model to explore paths to settlement. Unrecognized statehood emerges as an equilibrium outcome because a patron state persistently invests resources to sustain this outcome: we show, counterintuitively, patrons will make these investments even when unrecognized statehood is not their most preferred outcome. We assess comparative statics from the model to explore options available to actors in the international community who seek to impose their preferred outcomes in these disputes.