What might be known: Epistemic modality and uncertain contexts

Epistemic modals relativize the truth value of a proposition to some body of knowledge. It is thus reasonable to consider that their truth conditions concern at least as much the attitude of the speaker(s) towards the proposition as the content of the proposition itself. Epistemic modals can be seen as evidential comments on propositions (von Fintel and Gillies 2007). Veltman (1996), Groenendijk et al. (1996) and von Fintel and Gillies (2007) have shown that this particular contribution is better accounted for within a dynamic semantic implementation than in terms of more traditional (i.e. static) truth conditions. Albeit insightful, the dynamic formalization of epistemic modals causes a double problem. First declarative sentences containing an epistemic operator such as the one in (1) become non-informative1—even though they are defined as meaningful.