Prot Sharing and Monitoring in Partnerships*
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider partnerships among risk-averse professionals endowed with (i) a risky and personally-costly production technology and (ii) a personallycostly monitoring technology providing contractible noisy signals about partnersproductive e¤orts. Partners shirk both production and monitoring tasks because e¤orts are unobservable. We charaterize optimal partnership size, pro t shares and incentive payments when every partner performs the same tasks, and show that medium-sized partnerships are dominated by either smaller or larger partnerships. Prohibiting some partners from monitoring increases the incentives for others to monitor. We illustrate how task assignments and incentives interact, leading to improvements in partner welfare. JEL Classication: C72 L25 M52
منابع مشابه
All Health Partnerships, Great and Small: Comparing Mandated With Emergent Health Partnerships; Comment on “Evaluating Global Health Partnerships: A Case Study of a Gavi HPV Vaccine Application Process in Uganda”
The plurality of healthcare providers and funders in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) has given rise to an era in which health partnerships are becoming the norm in international development. Whether mandated or emergent, three common drivers are essential for ensuring successful health partnerships: trust; a diverse and inclusive network; and a clear governance structure. Mandated and ...
متن کاملProfit Sharing and Monitoring in Partnerships
We consider partnerships among risk-averse professionals endowed with (i) a risky and personally-costly production technology and (ii) a personally-costly monitoring technology providing contractible noisy signals about partners’ productive efforts. Partners shirk both production and monitoring tasks because efforts are unobservable. We characterize optimal partnership size, profit shares and i...
متن کاملMeasurement of prot inefficiency in presence of interval data using the directional distance function
In many applied programs in real-life problems, both physical inputs and outputsare heterogeneous which in this case the ecient cost and income modelcan not apply to evaluate the cost and income of related turnover. So, a measurementbased on the directional value of prot was presented which we havedeveloped it in this paper and have computed it for interval data. In fact, wehave measured the in...
متن کامل1 Equal Sharing Rules in Partnerships by Björn
Partnerships are the prevalent organizational form in many industries. Profits are most frequently shared equally among the partners. The purpose of our paper is to provide a rationale for equal sharing rules. We show that with inequity averse partners the equal sharing rule is the unique sharing rule that maximizes the partners' incentives to exert effort. We further show that inequity aversio...
متن کاملProposing a Model of Co-Creative Participation in Tourism Market
Objective There is a growing interest in the customers’ innovation in the realm of tourism studies. In the new global business ecosystem where individuals, organizations, governments and economy work together as an integrated network, we need a new innovation model. The model should be set at a level in which internal, external, cooperative and co-creative ideas can converge to create organiza...
متن کامل