Performance-Related-Pay and Shocks to Product Market Competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper studies the effects of product market competition on the explicit compensation packages that firms offer to their CEOs, executives and workers. We use a large sample of both traded and non-traded UK firms and exploit a quasi-natural experiment associated to an increase in competition. The sudden appreciation of the pound in 1996 implied different changes in competition for sectors with different degrees of openness. We provide difference in differences estimates and our results show that a higher level of product market competition increases the performance pay sensitivity of compensation schemes for all three groups of workers.
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