Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider an adverse selection environment, where an agent is able to understate his productivity, but not allowed to overstate it. We characterize the principal’s optimization problem. The solution to this problem is generally different than the solution to the standard problem, where no restriction is made on the statements that the agent can make. We identify a sufficient condition under which these two solutions coincide.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 56 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006