The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development

Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent decades, however, this has largely ceased. Most states that could do so appear relucant, while the weak cannot expand. This article presents a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the collective demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable expansion, while rising labour costs and the dynamics of military technology gradually dilute imperial advantage. Simultaneously, economic development leads to a secular decline in payoffs for appropriating land, minerals and capital. Once conquest no longer pays great powers, the systemic imperative to integrate production vertically also becomes archaic. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123410000232 Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-55599 Published Version Originally published at: Gartzke, Erik; Rohner, Dominic (2011). The political economy of imperialism, decolonization, and development. British Journal of Political Science, 41(3):525-556. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123410000232 British Journal of Political Science http://journals.cambridge.org/JPS Additional services for British Journal of Political Science: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development Erik Gartzke and Dominic Rohner British Journal of Political Science / Volume 41 / Issue 03 / July 2011, pp 525 556 DOI: 10.1017/S0007123410000232, Published online: 01 February 2011 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0007123410000232 How to cite this article: Erik Gartzke and Dominic Rohner (2011). The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development. British Journal of Political Science, 41, pp 525-556 doi:10.1017/ S0007123410000232 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/JPS, IP address: 130.60.47.14 on 14 Mar 2014 B.J.Pol.S. 41, 525–556 Copyright r Cambridge University Press, 2011 doi:10.1017/S0007123410000232 First published online 1 February 2011 The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development ERIK GARTZKE AND DOMINIC ROHNER* Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent decades, however, this has largely ceased. Most states that could do so appear relucant, while the weak cannot expand. This article presents a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the collective demise of the urge to colonize. Technological shocks enable expansion, while rising labour costs and the dynamics of military technology gradually dilute imperial advantage. Simultaneously, economic development leads to a secular decline in payoffs for appropriating land, minerals and capital. Once conquest no longer pays great powers, the systemic imperative to integrate production vertically also becomes archaic. ‘Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home y’ George W. Bush Two recent American wars in the Middle East have reawakened discussions of American Empire. In contrast to traditional patterns, however, the United States appears to have no desire to acquire more territory. Whether empire requires physical expansion and colonization, or simply ‘effective control’ of another society, seems to us to be largely definitional. Labelling American motives and practices as imperial, hegemonic or something else is perhaps less critical than attempting to understand why such behaviour * Department of Political Science, University of California-San Diego (email: [email protected]); Department of Economics, University of Zurich, respectively. The authors wish to thank Victor Asal, Alexander Cooley, Eugene Gholz, Lucy Goodhart, three referees and the Editor for comments. Vsevolod Gunitskiy provided research assistance. A version of this article was presented at the meeting of the Peace Science Society (International) in Columbus, Ohio, 2006. Dominic Rohner gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF grant no. 100014-122636). All data and a STATA ‘do’ file that replicates the analysis are available from the authors upon publication. 1 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Owl Books, 2001); Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004). 2 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 30. 3 Niall Ferguson prefers the term ‘empire’ to ‘hegemony’. ‘To compare . . . the United States and the United Kingdom as hegemonies is to miss differences that become obvious when the two are compared as empires.’ Distinguishing between US hegemony and British empire would highlight the differences Ferguson seeks to emphasize: ‘A century ago, the United Kingdom’s formal empire was very large indeed, covering nearly a quarter of the world’s surface and ruling roughly the same proportion of its population. Today, on the other hand, the United States’ formal empire includes just 14 dependencies (of which the largest is Puerto Rico) and covers less than 11,000 square kilometers.’ (Niall Ferguson, ‘Hegemony or Empire? Book Review’, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), pp. 160–1.) exists and evolves over time. We seek to explain the acquisition or abandonment of colonial holdings, offering an account that ties together the rise and fall of territorial expansion with the current American penchant for influence rather than long-term occupation. Developed nations exhibit little of the traditional preoccupation with obtaining land and resources through force. The appeal of colonial holdings evaporated for leading nations by the mid-twentieth century. Rather than reflecting an exception to traditional tendencies, American efforts represent secular change in the imperatives of power; owning land or minerals matters much less than guiding the global commons. One of the defining characteristics of the modern world has been the cycle of the European empire. In it, the familiar pattern of expansion and contraction is readily discernible. Yet while acts viewed as ‘imperialist’ may persist today, no nation or set of nations has come forward to pick up the gauntlet of empire. The world’s richest and most powerful countries show little interest in the continuous administration of foreign territory, as opposed to attempting to influence, intimidate or coerce foreign sovereigns and polities. These same powers are also vigorously opposed to allowing other countries to pursue any territorial ambitions. What some have labelled a norm of territorial integrity seems to us to require further explanation. What motivates an end of empire? Can we expect this phenomenon to continue or will the future return to historical patterns of imperial growth and decay? The notion of American Exceptionalism implies that other, less ‘exceptional’ nations will someday resurrect these more traditional patterns. China or India, for example, might use growing economic and military potential to expand at the expense of their neighbours. Alternatively, rising powers may find that control of physical space is best accomplished by proxy, ensuring that other countries accommodate Beijing or Delhi, rather than by actually having to conquer, and administer, marginally productive places that are geographically distant from the metropolis. We offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization based on the dynamics of systemic structure, military technology and economic development. Random capability shocks create military advantages that gradually decay as insights fade or equipment becomes outdated or as accumulating capital forces a change in the logic of military organization that dilutes initial military advantages. Military capability shocks by themselves can explain the cycle of empire, but not the secular trend away from territorial expansion. A second feature, economic development, has led nations gradually to prefer commerce to conquest. Capital abundance makes empire expensive, shifting incentives away from appropriating inputs to production and towards efforts to influence the terms under which nations interact. A third element explains the timing and rapidity of decolonization. Conquest imparts political control that invites the vertical integration of economic processes. Mercantilism in turn impels other countries to acquire or maintain colonies in order to access markets and inputs to production. This imperialist prisoner’s dilemma is reversed once influential actors prefer free market policies, allowing other countries to abandon empire as well. The theory predicts 4 President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela recently claimed in the United Nations that the United States was led by ‘the devil’. 5 See, for example, Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Knopf, 1993[1776]); Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932); George A. Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987). 6 Mark Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force’, International Organization, 55 (2001), 215–50; Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007). 526 GARTZKE AND ROHNER