Package Auctions and Package Exchanges
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Package Auctions and Exchanges
We report recent advances concerning the package allocation problem, in which traders seek to buy or sell combinations of goods. The problems are most difficult when some goods are not substitutes. In that case, competitive equilibrium typically fail to exist but the core is non-empty and comprises the competitive solutions. Also in that case, the Vickrey auction fails to select core allocation...
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This paper investigates bidding strategy in a package auction under incomplete information. I consider a simplified and limited case, where each bidder wants a unique bundle of goods and evaluates them as perfect complements. The auction is standard ascending with package bidding, however, I adopt the “proxy bidding rule.” The auction is interpretted as a limited version of Ausubel and Milgrom ...
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Congestions at loading docks can cause severe delays in logistics processes and cause increasing bottlenecks for truck routes. For warehouses, uncoordinated arrivals of trucks make appropriate staffing difficult and congestions can interfere with other processes at the facility. To mitigate congestions at loading docks, we propose package auctions to allocate time slots to trucks. The contribut...
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We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, “Reference Rules,” to make core-selecting package auctions more robust. Small, almostriskless, profitable deviations from “truthful bidding” are often easy for bidders to find under currently-used payment rules. Reference Rules perform better than existing rules on our marginal-incentive-to-deviate criterion, and are as robust as exis...
متن کاملPutting Auction Theory to Work: Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
Ascending auctions with package bidding and their economic uses are explained and the main results of recent FCC-sponsored experiments with such auctions are summarized. A benchmark model is formulated that accounts for the experimental results. In the benchmark, if each bidder bids “straightforwardly” at each round for its potentially most profitable package, then the total payoff is approxima...
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تاریخ انتشار 2005