Japanese Aid Diplomacy in Africa: An Historical Analysis

At the Gleneagles Summit in 2005 the leaders of G8 agreed to debt cancellation for 18 highly indebted poor, including 14 African, countries. Japan reluctantly had to accept the cancellation, which clearly demonstrates the shift of the Japanese aid policy which for so long was based on loan-centred assistance. The history of the Japanese aid diplomacy in Africa could be divided into 5 stages: the first stage (almost exclusively Asia directed aid), the second stage (recipient Africa with natural resources), the third stage (a rapid expansion of Japanese aid), the fourth stage (beginning of political commitment), and fifth stage (a shift of the Japanese aid diplomacy). Against the conventional perception Japanese aid was mainly motivated by longer rather than shorter economic benefits. Japan also maintained a hidden agenda to gain support among African nations related to its political ambition to become a permanent member of the UN security council. Yet, what is more important is the fact that Japanese initiatives in Africa was often motivated by its consideration to other regions and countries than Africa. 1, Background of Japanese Aid Diplomacy in Africa 1) International Evaluation of Japanese Development Assistance At the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005, the leaders of G8 agreed to boost aid for developing countries by $50 billion. Among them Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan pledged to boost $10 billion Japanese aid for five years between 2005 and 2009. The G8 leaders also agreed to full debt cancellation for 18 countries (14 African countries and other 4 countries). Initially Japan strongly resisted the ( 67 ) 67 ※ Professor, College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan © The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University: Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, 2005. ISSN 1347-8214. Vol.4, pp. 67-85 cancellation plan, reasoning that cancellation would bring about moral hazards among recipient countries. Eventually however, it had to compromise with other member states. The debate among G8 member states over the cancellation plan reflects the confrontation over the method of development aid between Japan and other major donors. In April 2003, Foreign Policy, an American journal, collaborating with the Global Development Center, a think tank, published a newly invented index, Commitment to Development Index (CDI). The index aimed to evaluate the diplomacy of 21 donor countries to developing countries in 6 areas: aid, trade, investment, peace-keeping operations, environment and immigration. Each area was given score from 0 to 9, and the total figure became a country’s general CDI. The Netherlands gained the highest CDI scoring 5.6, followed by Denmark (5.5) and Portugal (5.2). Japan was given the lowest rank with the score of 2.4. In the area of aid the evaluation of Japan was not remarkable either. It scored 1.2, the second lowest ranking only followed by the United States (0.8). There may be room for argument about this index. Is it really possible to measure the highly complex diplomacy in numerical terms in only six areas? Can we evaluate the country’s commitment to peace in the developing regions by simply calculating how many times it has participated in peace-keeping operations, ignoring many other factors such as the involvement in arms exports to conflict ridden regions? Nevertheless, the index is worth examining in that it reveals the significant perceptional gap between Japan and other donor countries over the ideal method of aid to developing counties. In the CDI measurement there are some rules of adjustment. The aid to poor countries with good governance gains additional scores, whereas the tied aid is subtracted scores. The Japanese government has long maintained that the loan rather than the grant is the desirable method of aid for developing countries. Actually, until recently, the majority of its aid took the form of loan, in particular the aid to East Asian countries. However, in the CDI measurement this is negatively evaluated, and large return loans subtract scores. It may not be so easy to conclude which one is the more appropriate method of aid between grant and loan without examining concrete historical conditions surrounding the recipient country. Yet, it is certain that Japan faces a serious challenge by the international donor community over its method and direction of aid. 68 ( 68 ) Makoto SATO